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1. Static vs. Dynamic Models of Pricing 
 
Standard textbook economic theory quite generally assumes the neo-
classical economic model, which is a static model of unregulated free 
markets. Every western government in our era believes implicitly in a 
free market with “springs,” where imbalances are only of short term 
nature. The model postulates the nonempirical idea of utility and 
assumes stable equilibrium, a notion that goes back over two 
hundred years to Adam Smith’s famous “Invisible Hand”.  
 
The standard, reigning theory of free markets asserts that 
individually selfish behavior can lead collectively to the greatest 
benefit of society. Modern dynamic approaches, in stark contrast, 
understand markets as far from equilibrium systems (McCauley,2004; 
Dosi, 2001). How did such fundamentally opposing viewpoints in 
teaching arise? We first define the basic elements of market dynamics 
independently of any particular model and then, after surveying the 
neo-classical model (Varian, 1992,1999)  critically, we discuss in the 
other three sections of this article the empirical basis and implications 
of market disequilibrium. 
 
To model a market consider N agents who buy and sell n assets. By 
agents, we mean consumers, producers, traders, etc. At any given 
time t each agent holds quantities x(t)=(x1,…,xn) of the n different 
assets. The price of the assets is denoted by p(t)=(p1,…,pn). The basis 
for modelling the dynamics of a market of n assets and N traders is 
the differential equation (or a discrete iterated equation) dp/dt=ε(p,t) 
where ε(p,t)=D(p,t)-S(p,t) is the excess demand calculated for all N 
agents. Here, D is the total demand and S is the total supply for a 
given asset “at price p” (in reality there is always a bid/ask spread, 
so by ”p” we mean the price of the last trade). Equilibrium is defined 
by vanishing excess demand, ε=0. Static models of markets assume a 
dominant stable equilibrium point. That would require a restoring 
force pulling p back to equilibrium, something like a spring in the 
market. In other words, the neo-classical model provides not a 
completely static market but a trivial dynamic system as opposed to 
chaotic or complex one.  
 
In the neo-classical approach one begins by postulating a utility 
function U(x) for each agent. Utility maximization subject to an 
agent’s budget constraint predicts a downward sloping demand 
curve p=f(x) for the standard case of decreasing returns. Profit 
maximization or an initial endowment is assumed in order to obtain 
an upward sloping neoclassical supply curve p=g(x). These functions 
must then be inverted to obtain the demand and supply schedules 
x=D(p) and x=S(p) required by dynamics. Here, the dynamic 
appoach to equilibrium does not represent trading, but only 
represents a “price-adjustment auction”, as was proposed by Leon 
Walras. 
 
The statics of the neo-classical model lies in the assumption that there 
is no trading at all unless and until all prices reach equilibrium, at 
which point all sellers and buyers simply exchange goods. In other 
words, the neo-classical theory provides only a model of a pure 
barter economy where the economic efficiency e=min(S/D, D/S) is 
fixed artificially at 100%. The meaning of the model is that every 
agent who wants to trade does so. There is no excess demand or 
supply, or shortage of labor or goods and services, and no 
unemployment. Kenneth Arrow (1958) has shown that the condition 
for the mathematical existence of a neo-classical equilibrium is that 
all agents have the same perfect information all the way into the 
infinite future, and conform to the same view of the future. Money 
does not and cannot appear: there is no capital accumulation, there is 
no demand for financial markets: the price p in the model is only a 
label (Kirman, 1989). This means that the variable p doesn’t represent 
any physical or informational quantity. It doesn’t represent a piece of 
paper or a piece of metal, bits in computer memory, or even an 
unspoken obligation to pay something at a later time. In other words, 
it represents no aspect that is characteristic of “money”. 
  
The first econophysicist, M.F.M. Osborne (1977), tried hard to make 
sense of textbook economic theory, and consequently pointed out 
that the neo-classical supply-demand curves do not occur empirically 
in microeconomic reality. He explained that price as a function of 
demand p=f(x) does not exist mathematically because the observable 
quantity, demand as a function of price x=D(p), is noninvertible 
because it’s a step function. There’s a connection with nontrivial 
dynamics. Unknown to Osborne, Hamiltonian models were used in 
economics in applications to markets of the theory of optimization 
and control. In a nonintegrable Hamiltonian system the analog of 
Osborne’s microeconomic result is that the canonical momentum p 
=f(q) does not exist as a function of generalized coordinate q. This 
was first noted by Einstein in 1917 in the context of explaining why 
the three body problem and mixing systems are not susceptible to 
Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization rules (McCauley, 1997). That explains 
Osborne’s empirical observation from a theoretical standpoint, but 
only for economic models defined by optimization and control via 
maximizing a utility functional. In the nonintegrable case a utility 
function and stable equilibria do not exist. There are only a path-
dependent functional U and unstable equilibria (hyperbolic points). 
The utility functional coincides with the action in Hamiltonian 
dynamics (McCauley, 2004).  
 
Another interesting inconsistency in the standard textbook model 
was uncovered by Hugo Sonnenschein (1973), who showed that if 
one starts with individual agents who maximize utility locally (neo-
classical microeconomic model), then aggregation over all agents 
does not lead to a neo-classical macroeconomic model (downward 
sloping demand curve p=f(x)), or to any definite supply-demand 
curves at all: any curves at all or none are possible. In other words: 
Combining the results of Sonnenshein and Osborne, we can say that 
there is no theoretical or empirical underpinning for the neo-classical 
macroeconomic intersecting supply-demand curves portrayed 
nonempirically in every standard economics text.  
 
From the standpoint of econophysics, which requires empirically-
grounded and falsifiable models of markets, we see that the neo-
classical economic model has been falsified both on the micro- and 
macroeconomic scales: none of its predictions has been found to be 
even approximately true. Yet, the World Bank, the IMF, the US 
Treasury and the EU persist in applying the model to formulate 
requirements to be met by Third World  countries to obtain loans 
(Stiglitz, 2002), and to so-called First World countries, e.g., to demand 
that agricultural subsidies be eliminated with the expectation of 
improving market efficiency. The neo-classical model teaches 
equilibrium and stability whereas George Soros (1994) and Joseph 
Stiglitz (2002) have observed qualitatively, based on experience, that 
markets are unstable.  
 
But game theory (Poundstone, 1992) is also used in economic 
theorizing and predicts equilibria, so it’s necessary to consider that 
approach as well. The neo-classical notion of expected utility was 
invented by D. Bernoulli in an attempt to resolve the St. Petersburg 
Paradox. Expected utility was later used by John von Neumann and 
Oscar Morgenstern to formulate the theory of cooperative games. 
Much later still came a class of neo-classical equilibrium models with 
efficiency less than 100%, called ‘asymmetric information’, that 
assumes that sellers know more than buyers. From this standpoint an 
equilibrium based on expected utility maximization is predicted in 
the “Lemon Trap Model” invented by George Ackerlof (1984), which 
was used later by Paul Krugman (2000) to discuss the idea of 
Keynesian liquidity traps. But there is no dynamics in the asymmetric 
information model, and there is also no empirical evidence for the 
equilibrium predicted by the model. The model does take a 
qualitative step in the right direction by avoiding the completely 
unrealistic assumption of perfect information and infinite foresight 
by all agents, all of whom are economic clones of a single ‘infinitely 
rational’ agent. 
 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s original game theoretic results are 
effectively confined to two players. Three or more players were 
treated only in a mean field approximation, which is unrealistic. John 
Nash later discovered a class of neo-classical equilibria not included 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern in game theory, whereby agents 
exhibit selfish behavior and are supposed to have no regrets after 
playing the game. Nash’s aim was to model Adam Smith’s Invisible 
Hand. However, there is no empirical evidence for Nash equilibria. 
Nash equilibria require “defection” rather than “cooperation” in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, e.g., and in other noncooperative games. In order 
to make an empirical test, good statistics are required, but when the 
prisoner’s dilemma is played repeatedly, yielding the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma, then the agents tend to cooperate rather than 
defect. This was first shown by the famous Dresser experiment. Von  
Neumann later abandoned game theory as a tool for social and 
economic modelling in favor of the study of automata (Mirowski, 
2002). 
 
Fortunately, there is a way to test any set of market price data 
empirically for the influence of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand. The 
implication of the Invisible Hand is that a stable equilibrium occurs. 
Empirically, noise should cause small fluctuatutions about this 
equilibrium, or at least about a steady state, and in this way one can 
either confirm or falsify the assumption of equilibrium. Therefore, 
one needs only to test observed time series of prices p(t) for 
stationarity (McCauley, 2004). To date, there is no convincing 
evidence for stationarity of any known price data from real markets. 
In particular, observed financial market distributions, both 
empirically and in realistic models, are very far from stationarity.  
 
 
2. Deterministic Models of Economic Systems 
 
The first purely theoretical illustration of the lack of internal 
consistency dynamically within the neo-classical model was 
produced by Herbert Scarf (). He constructed a model utility whereby 
three agents exchange three assets. Scarf then showed that instead of 
equilibrium one finds a stable limit cycle where, according to the neo-
classical assumptions, trading is never allowed. It shows that 
production also is not described, all that is traded is the “initial 
endowment” of each agent.  Later, Donald Saari (1995) pointed out 
that excess demand functions that disobey Arrow’s restrictions will 
typically produce nonintegrable, chaotic  models.  
 
More interesting is that Roy Radner (1968) showed that, even though 
the neo-classical equilibrium is formally mathematically guaranteed 
“to exist”, if one introduces the slightest uncertainty then the agents 
can’t compute/locate that equilibrium. So complexity shows its face 
as soon as one tries to introduce uncertainty into the neo-classical 
equilibrium model: Radner’s proof of lack of computability of 
equilibrium via a Turing machine is equivalent to maximum 
computational complexity. Money and financial markets do not 
appear in the equilibrium model, where goods are merely exchanged. 
Where and how, then, might “money” enter into the picture? Alan 
Kirman (1989) has suggested that demand for money, in other words 
liquidity demand, does not appear in the usual neo-classical 
equilibrium model because the future is completely determined. 
Kirman speculates that liquidity demand and the consequent supply 
of money should arise from uncertainty: without uncertainty about 
how to list and cover one’s future needs, money is unnecessary.  
 
Can one derive the demand for money by relaxing any of the 
assumptions slightly within a neo-classical setting? The bounded 
rationality model of Per Bak et al (1999) attempts to do exactly that. 
In agreement with Kirman, something suggestive of money appears 
transiently  in Bak’s utility maximization model after adding 
uncertainty in the form of noise, but markets still are cleared at the 
end of each trading day as in the original noise-free model. Therefore, 
capital and capital accumulation in the form of financial markets still 
do not appear. There is, to date, no utility-based model that includes 
the possibility of financial markets, and financial markets now 
dominate the world. In addition, business cycles, market bubbles and 
crashes and all other dynamic market activity are impossible to 
discuss meaningfully from within the neo-classical picture, which we 
now abandon in favor of empiric reality. 
 
The basic aim in economics still is to replicate the original financial 
market success of M.F.M. Osborne (Cootner, 1964), Fischer Black and 
Myron Scholes (1973): to construct a falsifiable economic model that 
captures the main features of some particular market over a 
reasonable era. In the face of all the thick economics texts on library 
shelves, this problem stands completely unsolved. 
 
 
3. Business Cycles 
 
Business cycles (Cootner, 1964) would require either perodicity or 
approximating quasiperiodicity. The best bet for a model of a 
business cycle, if a business cycle exists, might be a stable but noisy 
limit cycle. Evidence for peridodicity in market data was searched for 
by Maurice Kendall and by Clive Granger and Oscar Morgenstern 
but no evidence for stable or neutral perodicity was found. We know 
now that stable periodicity requires negative Liapunov exponents, 
neutrally stable motion corresponds to vanishing exponents. 
 
Deterministic chaos is pseudorandom via unstable periodicity and 
unstable quasiperiodicity. In the 1980’s, the heyday of nonlinear 
dynamics, evidence for deterministic chaos was sought in economic 
data in the search for empirical evidence for positive Liapunov 
exponents. Again, the results were negative. To date, no 
approximately correct and falsifiable deterministic model of market 
dynamics exists.  
 
Falsifiable stochastic models of financial markets are available, but 
show no evidence for a business cycle, or for any market periodicity 
at all. The problem with trying to model business cycles is the lack of 
hard empirical evidence for the notion of any evident 
periodicity/regularity.  
 
Markets go up and markets go down, but with no apparent 
regularity. Therefore, under the influence of statistical physicists and 
nonlinear dynamicists working in economics and finance 
(‘econophysicists”) the emphasis in the last decade has switched from 
looking for business cycles to  the attempt to explain the dynamics of 
the large price movements that are clearly indicated by financial 
market statistics. These large fluctuations are characterized by so-
called “fat tails” in the returns distribution (McCauley, 2004). Let p(t) 
denote the price of an asset at time t. The idea of a fat tailed 
probability density f(x) of returns x=lnp(t)/p(0), is that for large 
magnitude returns  one observes f(x)•x-µ, where µ is the “tail 
exponent”. Fat tailed returns distributions are very easy to model 
mathematically, therefore the problem is how to eliminate the 
nonuniqueness, the ability to derive exactly the same tail exponent 
from many different dynamical models not included in any well-
defined universality class, and arrive at a mathematical model that 
reflects approximately what a given market really is doing 
dynamically. This leads us to stochastic models of financial markets. 
 
 
4. Stock Market Dynamics 
 
The first stochastic model of asset pricing obeying the constraint of 
nonnegative prices is Osborne’s lognormal model of prices (Cootner, 
1964). There, the return x=lnp(t)/p(0) is assumed to be Gaussian. 
Since prices are unbounded in the absence of price controls, 
Osborne’s lognormal model of the price distribution is nonstationary: 
the Gibbs entropy of the distribution increases without bound. The 
lognormal pricing model was used by Fischer Black and Myron 
Scholes some fifteen years after Osborne’s discovery in order to 
construct the first falsifiable model of option pricing. The model fails 
(honorably) to describe asset prices correctly because large returns x 
occur with much greater frequency than can be explained by the 
Gaussian distribution.  
 
There was once hope, inspired by Benoit Mandelbrot (Cootner, 
1964)), that Levy distributions could be applied to financial markets, 
but the range of observed (nonuniversal) tail exponents µ of 
empirical financial distributions are much too large for the Levy 
distribution to be of interest. For small to moderate returns, the 
empirical distribution is exponential in x (McCauley and Gunaratne, 
2003; McCauley, 2004), the distribution is not approximately 
Gaussian or Levy. The exponential distribution has interesting 
stochastic dynamics: a diffusion coefficient that is linear in (x-Rt)/•t 
is implied in a Markovian model, where R=<lnp(t)/p(0)> is the 
expected return. Good agreement with option pricing by traders has 
been obtained by using this model. Again, the model is far from 
stationarity.  Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand is apparently completely 
unreliable in financial markets, which have no equilibria and 
certainly no springs. 
 
The deduction of market dynamics from empirical data is not unique 
due to the limitations of finite precision in measurement. The 
nonuniqueness occurs in the following way. E.g., there are infinitely 
many different Markov models that generate the observed time 
dependence of the exponential distribution, but (fortunately) it has 
been shown that those models cannot be distinguished from each 
other on a trading time scale that is small compared with one 
hundred years. The greater problem is how to model nonfinancial 
markets in any meaningful way. The worse the data, the greater is 
the problem of nonuniqueness in deducing the dynamics empirically.  
 
Nonuniqueness in deducing dynamics from data is a lesson that is 
anticipated from recent experience in nonlinear dynamics, where if a 
chaotic system has a generating partition then the partition (and not 
statistics) characterizes the dynamical model (Gunaratne, 1990). To 
determine which chaotic model generated a particular observed time 
series, then the generating partition must be extracted to within 
relatively high numerical precision from that series. This was found 
to be quite difficult for empirical data at the transition to turbulence, 
but no simpler alternative is available.  
 
Cris Moore (1990. 1991) has explained implicitly why we should have 
no hope to be able to deduce dynamics of complexity from truly 
complex empirical data: a complex deterministic system has no 
generating partition. In the spirit of modern nonlinear dynamics, 
Moore went on to present examples of one and two dimensional 
iterated maps that are Turing machine-equivalent (Koiran and 
Moore, 1999). Financial data have been modelled so far by non-
complex stochastic dynamics. The complexity is hidden in the 
expected return R, which can change suddenly and which we do not 
know how to model in any useful way. 
 
Summarizing, no falsifiable, approximately correct dynamic model of 
any nonfinancial market exists. The multitude of “graphs” presented 
without error bars in current economics texts are not better than 
cartoons, because they are not based on real empirical data, only on 
falsified neo-classical expectations. This is good news for econophysicists 
and nonmainstream economists: they can analyze the available 
economic data and try to rewrite the economics texts, if they want to 
take on that challenge. The goal is to make nonfinancial economic 
modelling more like present-day finance modelling, which is firmly 
empirically grounded.  
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